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his is an extremely impressive book, and in my 
view, impressive in a way that is rather unusual in 
philosophy these days. The arguments are not only 
consistently subtle, they are, as far as is possible when 
doing ambitious contemporary philosophy, consistently 
transparent. There is no sneering at one’s opponent, no 
uncritical reliance on a fashionable phrase or slogan, no 
resistance to acknowledging where the arguments may 
seem vulnerable to contrary intuitions, or simply, as all 
arguments must, run out of justificatory power on their 
own. It is remarkably good, and remarkably honest. 
Scanlon seeks to defend what he calls “realism about 
reasons” in a series of lectures that both sketch out his 
T 
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own position and, equally importantly, seek to show why 
the typical objections to realism about reasons are in fact 
not so very well founded after all. In his resistance at 
every turn to the picture of reasons defended by the non-
cognitivist or expressivist, Scanlon is committed to giving 
us an exceptionally ambitious argument. For such 
resistance entails then offering a picture quite different 
from the one the expressivist relies on with respect to a 
wealth of connected matters: what there is in the world 
(the “ontology” of reasons if you will), how we can know 
of such things, or have confidence in our conclusions, if 
reasons are to be thought of as real, but not as natural 
facts, and how the beliefs we reach in these domains can, 
simply as beliefs, nevertheless be motivationally 
efficacious. There is a great deal of provocative, original 
argument on all of these subjects, and anyone interested in 
these matters will find much in this book to think about, 
and, I am sure, learn from. This is not to say there are no 
significant difficulties in Scanlon’s argument. There are, 
and they will occupy us shortly. But it is overall an 
exceptionally substantive addition to the present debate on 
normativity, which is currently dominated by a conception 
that takes commitment to naturalism to entail 
understanding reasons essentially as non-cognitive states, 
as non-cognitive desires. Scanlon understands the 
demands of naturalism as well as any, but argues 
convincingly that the explanatory power of reasons cannot 
be understood, or perhaps better, cannot be preserved, 
should we see reasons themselves as natural facts.  
 
In one way, this is, as I have said, an exceptionally 
ambitious work, arguing against the current orthodoxy for a 
conception that sees reasons as “real” and as a result, for all 
the other things that must also be the case if this claim is to 
be defended. But in another sense, under Scanlon’s view, 
we wind up in a place that is disarmingly modest, 
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disarmingly familiar. Reasons may be real, and may obtain 
in virtue of considerations that exist quite apart from our 
saying so, but the world that results is the messy one we 
know all too well already, where how reasons are to be 
assessed, or compared with one another, is very elusive, 
perhaps in many cases irreducibly personal. Scanlon 
consistently argues that his view, while undeniably 
philosophically controversial, is in fact far closer to 
common practice, and common sense, than that of his 
rivals. And he may be more right than he realizes, 
particularly with respect to where, on his account, we end 
up, with respect to what we can say about the worth, or 
weight of some reason or other we appeal to, in justifying 
some act or other. To think of reasons as he does, as real, 
which is to say, as irreducible, is not to hold that we 
always, or even frequently, have a kind of determinate 
conception of their relative or comparative status. There is 
a deep, to me, very suggestive, tension in Scanlon’s view, 
between a certain kind of objectivism and an ambivalent 
sense of the limits of that objectivism. And this tension, the 
ways in which the “objectivism” Scanlon defends is quite 
modest, quite limited, is, as I say, very close indeed to how 
real life seems to me. Scanlon defends no general principle 
of reason-assessment, no grand theory of that in virtue of 
which a reason can be called a good one. Indeed, he is 
overtly, and to my mind, rightly, skeptical of any such 
possibility. The idea that we could have a good, plausible, 
metric of reason assessment, appropriate before all cases 
(how Kant would have understood the categorical 
imperative test for example) is rejected. For Scanlon, there 
can only be particular, local conclusions about particular 
considerations, particular arguments we happen to find 
convincing when we think about them in the right way. 
And on the other side of the spectrum, there will be 
arguments of uncertain justificatory authority, and this fact, 
the uncertain status, will never be otherwise, however much 
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we might try to have it so. Many will find this feature of the 
argument frustrating and I well understand such feelings. 
But we must ask ourselves whether the frustrations here 
reflect a defect in the argument, or a feature of the world 
that such arguments seek faithfully to describe. If we are to 
traffic in considerations that genuinely explain action, 
genuinely explain the nature of advice we give to others or 
the nature of self-justification, we must countenance 
irreducible talk of reasons; we must think of reasons as real 
and not think of reason talk as a proxy for some other 
natural thing. But how these reasons stack up against more 
or less personal expressions of normative assessment, the 
degree to which they truly do justify an action—here, 
philosophy may to have little to offer of a systematic sort, 
except an accurate description of a very unsystematic state 
of affairs. The currency in which we assess our world 
normatively must be understood irreducibly, autonomously 
if you will. But the assessments themselves, the claims we 
make about our reasons, their weight or authority—these 
claims I think will vary enormously, and run from the 
impossible to challenge to the deeply idiosyncratic.  
 
This last remark is not Scanlon’s language; it is mine. And 
he might well chafe at the degree of agent centered 
relativism it appears to countenance. I expect he would 
certainly chafe at the suggestion that we wind up with a 
position, within his very own framework, that is essentially 
identical to that of the expressivist on one important 
matter—the authority of reasons—before a very important 
category of action for which we offer reasons. But I believe 
this is so all the same, and I will argue for that conclusion 
below. Connected to this claim is another, more elusive 
one: philosophical generalizations about “the normative” or 
about reasons as such can reach only so far. A unified 
treatment of the normative will fail to capture, will blur 
over, important differences in the nature of justification that 
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holds across different kinds of cases. The expressivist, 
Scanlon argues, to me convincingly, has very much the 
wrong the view about what a reason is. But the expressivist 
may be well right, over an important range of cases, about 
the sort thing an appeal to reason amounts to. Realism 
about reasons is one thing. The degree to which such 
realism about reasons gives us objectivity in our normative 
judgments is very much another.   
 
Let me begin with the argument that is surely the most 
central of all, the explanation of intentional action by 
reference to reasons, and why such explanations require we 
construe reasons “realistically.”  
 
INTENTIONAL EXPLANATION AND THE 
(IRREDUCIBLE) REALITY OF REASONS 
 
Reasons are complex creatures. When we offer, or point to, 
a reason, we do not simply explain our action (should we 
have acted on that reason), we offer a justification for it 
too. It is this distinctive feature of justification that cannot 
be preserved should we abandon talk of reasons, or seek to 
translate talk of reasons into talk of desires and their 
satisfaction. And since justification talk is ineliminable—it 
is inseparably bound up with making sense of intentional 
action; our world would not make sense without it—
autonomous talk of reasons will be ineliminable too. Of 
course, that (very briefly) is so far simply Scanlon’s view. 
It is not yet an argument for its truth. 
 
Consider the following. Someone is driving a fast moving 
automobile and he will injure and possibly kill a pedestrian 
if he does not turn the wheel. It seems obvious, Scanlon 
argues, that the fact that he will injure or kill the pedestrian 
is a reason to turn the wheel. The normative character of 
this reason begins to come into focus if we contrast it with 
Essays in Philosophy 16(2) 
 
267 
 
a mere explanation, an “explanatory reason.” We can say 
the reason the driver turned the wheel is because he wanted 
to avoid hitting the pedestrian. That explains his action, if 
indeed it is true. But the normative reason, the reason to 
turn the wheel, that is clearly is present whether the driver 
turns the wheel or not. And so obviously, it cannot be 
identical with any desire the driver has, fails to have, or 
might have had. In a way, the normative character of 
reasons, the justificatory nature of our appeal to reasons, 
and the way such justification stories cannot be understood 
as appeals to some desire or other comes out more vividly 
when we take up a case where the reason is offered in the 
face of hostility. Consider a case where in a borrowed car I 
turn the wheel to avoid killing a cat, and as a result, damage 
the fender. I then justify myself to the unhappy owner by 
offering this fact as a reason, a justification story for why I 
turned the wheel. But this claim is a justification, can be a 
justification, only if I am:  
 
…calling that person’s attention to what I claim to 
be a fact, independent of both of us, about what one 
has reason to do…Whether the other person agrees 
with it or not, my claim that p was a reason for me 
to do a responds to his challenge, in a way that 
expressing my acceptance of a norm, or a plan, or 
an attitude of approval does not. (59-60) 
 
I cannot simply be confessing what I wanted; that cannot 
(in a case like this) be a justification at all. Offering a 
reason has to be something else entirely—pointing to a fact, 
or consideration, that is said to justify an action in virtue of 
the sort of fact, and sort of act, it is. These inter-related 
notions—offering a reason, offering a justification, pointing 
to considerations that genuinely do meet, or purport to 
meet, rational criticism, or the demand for a justification—
are in a significant sense “foundational.” By that I mean: 
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we cannot translate these notions into purely naturalistic 
ones and preserve their character, any more than we could 
translate logical operators like modus ponens into the 
empirical states coextensive with their use and in doing so 
preserve their character. Recalling the example above of 
the cat and the fender, the question is not, cannot be, “what 
did I want?” (or what did I approve of) but “what should I 
want, what am I entitled to want?” and so forth. 
Normativity is intrinsically… well, normative.   
 
But why exactly must accepting this platitude mean that 
expressivist views must be wrong? After all, expressivists 
are not explicitly “eliminativists” about the normative; they 
think of themselves as offering a very plausible conception 
of normativity. They hardly deny the practice of giving 
reasons and offering justifications; they just deny that there 
are any properties corresponding to these activities.  
 
Expressivist views were developed, Scanlon notes correctly 
“largely to explain the significance of normative judgments 
for the agent who makes them—to explain how such 
judgments “motivate” an agent.” (58) How well they in fact 
manage to do this will occupy us later on. Scanlon, with 
great originality, approaches this question via another, one 
rarely taken up in meta-ethics: what is the picture, when 
within expressivism, of giving advice to another? What is 
the picture on this account of interpersonal discourse? It is, 
in a word, hopeless.  
 
According to Gibbard, to judge that p is a reason to 
do a in circumstances c is to plan to weigh the fact 
that p in favor of doing a in such circumstances. It 
would seem to follow that to advise someone that p 
is a reason to a in her circumstances is to express 
my acceptance of a plan to weigh the fact that p in 
favor of a in such conditions. This does not seem to 
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capture the normative grip that that advice is 
intended to have on someone who believes what the 
adviser says. Why should she care what I plan to 
do? We might try to close the gap by ascending to a 
higher level: my advice could consist in expressing 
my acceptance of a plan to adopt the plan of 
weighing the fact that p in favor of a in her 
circumstances. But the gap remains. Why should 
she care what plans I plan to adopt?   
Taking my advice as “expressing approval” 
of weighing p in favor of a … may sound more 
plausible. But this is because approval can mean so 
many different things. I can, for example, approve 
of someone’s weighing p in favor of a because I 
find this flattering, or because it will lead the person 
to do something that will benefit me. In order to 
capture the idea of [giving] advice, the idea of 
approval needs to be specified more exactly. 
“Expressing approval” appears to describe what is 
going on in giving advice if (I would say only if) we 
take it to be approval of the person’s attitude on the 
ground that what he or she takes to be a reason 
actually is one. (58-59)  
 
The point is really not so very different from how we 
understand ordinary empirical belief. Unless we think of 
the belief as at least purporting to refer to something going 
on outside the head, what is going on inside cannot 
possibly be justified (this point has been with us since 
Descartes). The whole practice of giving or accepting 
advice does not survive philosophical self-consciousness, 
should we think the expressivist view correct. Much as 
Sartre’s conception of “choice” would make it so choice 
would in fact have no point, “advice”—giving it or taking it 
–under Gibbard’s theory (should we sincerely think it right) 
would be pointless, would disappear.  
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All right, the reader might say, when making sense of what 
is going when justifying my actions to the angry car owner, 
or telling someone he really should think about his dying 
mother before going off to Thailand, this seems right. 
Surely this cannot just be a recitation of what I have 
approved of, without further reference to the idea of this 
“approval” being itself (allegedly) justified in virtue of 
some consideration or other. And no matter how many 
times we try, we just cannot capture justification by 
reference to some approval function that is thought of as 
unmoored in the world. Fair enough. But are there not cases 
where my desire alone gives me all the “reason” I need? 
Perhaps in these cases, the idea of “justification” shrinks 
too. What more “reason” do I need to drink pumpkin 
flavored beer than the fact that I desire to do so? What 
more reason could there be?  
 
Indeed, indeed. Scanlon’s handling of such cases is both 
impressive and evasive; it is here I think that the difficulties 
in, or the limitations of, Scanlon’s view begin to appear. 
Scanlon’s treatment of desire-as-justification arises in the 
context of his considering the threshold challenge posed by 
Mark Schroeder’s reductive desire theory: that reasons just 
are desires (where that is understood as some natural fact, 
available to a science like psychology), and so a person’s 
having a reason just consists in some fact about that 
person’s desires and what will promote them. (6) Schroeder 
offers a persuasive argument for this view in his example of 
Ronnie, who likes to dance, and Bradley, who can’t stand 
it. Surely, Schroeder claims, (“plausibly,” Scanlon is nice 
enough to add) that the fact that there will be dancing at the 
party is a reason for Ronnie to go but not a reason for 
Bradley to go. (47) But Scanlon wants to distinguish the 
following. First, there is the question, what explains the 
difference between Ronnie and Bradley. Here, no doubt, 
what explains the difference will be some natural fact, 
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some neural or functional fact (if you will) true of one, not 
true of the other. Then there is the question, “why the fact 
that Ronnie enjoys dancing makes it the case that the fact 
that there will be dancing at the party gives him a reason to 
go.” And here the answer the Humean, or Schroeder, would 
give, “because Ronnie has a desire for experiences that he 
finds pleasant,” is not obviously the most satisfactory 
answer at all. Suppose Ronnie would enjoy dancing but 
does not know it, does not, on this assumption, have this 
desire; surely he would still have a reason to go all the 
same. Scanlon prefers to say the fact that Ronnie enjoys 
dancing (or would enjoy it) is what gives him a reason to 
go. (49-50) 
 
What is the difference? By speaking of a fact, a 
consideration, apart from a desire, in this case, the fact that 
someone enjoys a certain thing, Scanlon puts this case, 
explanatorily, on a par with all the others. The fact that 
“Ronnie enjoys dancing” functions, in the justificatory 
story, exactly like the fact that “the cat would die had I not 
swerved” in the earlier car crash case. It is a fact, or 
consideration, independent of desire, that justifies the 
intentional act, justifies it by pointing to a reason. If the act 
is intentional, it has a reason, and a reason is a 
consideration we can, (we must) make sense of 
independent of the desire that may, or may not, be 
responsive to this consideration. It is rare of course in these 
sorts of cases—where my reason is the fact that I enjoy the 
act I go on to perform—that the reason and the desire might 
come apart (something that by contrast often happens when 
we have a reason to diet or to exercise say)—but neither is 
it impossible, or inconceivable. And, as a result, framing 
the reason story this way, even in these cases, is better able 
to handle the counterfactuals mentioned above too (where 
Ronnie has a reason to go even if he does not in fact know 
this, and so does not have a desire to go).   
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But the reader cannot help but notice an asymmetry too, 
and questions as to whether anything interesting follows 
from this asymmetry are unfortunately not really taken up. 
Let me explain. In the case where I swerve to avoid killing 
the cat, it is easy to speak of the reason apart from any 
desire. Indeed, the callous driver who does not swerve 
clearly, and undeniably, fails to respond to a reason we can 
make sense apart from his indifference—easily. But if the 
“fact” is “the fact that I enjoy X,” obviously, this fact can 
obtain before any X you like. In a way, this is good; this is 
what we want. So, that fact that I enjoy marijuana gives me 
a reason to smoke marijuana, the fact that I enjoy the Bach 
piano partitas gives me a reason to go put one on, the fact 
that I enjoy getting away with small acts of shoplifting 
gives me a reason to engage in small acts of shoplifting… 
and on and on we go. Scanlon may have distinguished “the 
fact of enjoyment” from “the desire” in terms of what 
occupies the relevant place holder in the framework of 
explanation by reference to a reason, but the truth 
conditions for the reason (in this case) are pretty much 
identical with the truth conditions for the desire, and this I 
submit is going to be quite distinctive to cases of this kind; 
it is exactly what is not the case in the example where I 
swerve to avoid the cat (and in other the standard examples 
so dear to Scanlon). And I don’t think we want to make too 
much of the possible counterfactual, “you would enjoy it if 
you tried it”—and as a result, go on to make the claim that 
even without a desire, you have a reason, where the reason 
is now the so called fact of enjoyment were you to act in 
ways to which you are presently disinclined. That remark is 
probably true for me right now with respect to all sorts of 
interesting substances, but it hardly follows that I really do 
have a reason right now to ingest any of them.  
 
Does this difference, the difference in the role desire plays 
across these cases, matter? Yes, I think it does. I think it 
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certainly does in trying to understand the different uses to 
which appeal to a reason may be put. I want to suggest 
something Scanlon shies away from, the possibility of 
distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” ways in which 
appeal to a reason may do normative, or justifying, work.  
 
When I say, “I drink whiskey because I enjoy it”, I am 
offering a “reason” in what I would call a weak sense. 
When I say, “I swerved to avoid hitting that pedestrian” I 
am offering a reason in what I would call a strong one. In 
the first case, I am really just naming the fact that explains 
my actions as an intentional act. I am not under hypnosis, I 
am not acting on a bet; fine. But in the second case, in 
addition, I claim that my acting on the consideration in 
question holds up under critical scrutiny, is, in short, a good 
reason. There is no way we can be saying this when simply 
saying “I do X because I enjoy it,” because obviously, we 
could (and do) enjoy anything, and if we say we are, in 
these cases, also offering a “good reason,” then the idea of 
a “good reason” can now have no truth conditions. Scanlon 
scoffs at the view of reasons that would see them as 
identical to desires when he asks, “Does a person really 
have a reason to do what will fulfill any desire he or she 
has, no matter how foolish?” and it is a nice alarmist point. 
(4) But surely he is in the same position—does a person 
have a reason to do that which enables him to enjoy 
whatever it is he (or she) enjoys, no matter how foolish? 
Well, yes, I think we can say so—but only in a very weak 
sense of reason, the sense that pretty much simply tracks 
the idea of minimal intentionality.   
 
In this minimal sense of reason, Scanlon’s position I think 
is very reminiscent of Davidson’s in “Mental Events.” If an 
act is to be thought of as intentional, Davidson argues, then 
we must characterize it as having a mental cause. And if 
has a mental cause, then there is a certain story here that is 
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not the same sort of story as the story of law like causation 
that is coextensive with it. No law like causal story captures 
the sort of rationalizing—the kind of sense we make of an 
action—that reference to a mental cause does. If we were to 
replace “mental cause” with “reason,” and replace “law like 
causation” with “desire,” we move pretty seamlessly from 
Davidson to Scanlon. Reference to some natural state, some 
natural cause (in the context of this argument, some non-
cognitive desire) will never give us the justification for an 
action that reference to a reason does. Of course, 
Davidson’s actual position speaks of the mental attribution 
as an artifact of “interpretation,” and this part of the 
argument, the non-factualism, is best set aside. (Viewing 
Davidson from within the lens of contemporary meta-
ethics, one might say he makes a Mackie like mistake here, 
taking “the real” or “the factual” to be only what is 
identical to the domain of the natural sciences, and so he 
has no alternative but to call mental attributions 
“interpretations.”) If we instead spoke of mental 
attributions as simply “not empirical,” not identical to 
purely naturalistic attributions (or properties)—and no 
longer spoke of any attribution as “non-factual”—then I 
think the two positions get very close. When looking at 
intentional action, acts intentionally expressive of mental 
states, we must countenance a certain sort of non-empirical 
talk as fundamental, as not reducible to the empirical, if we 
are to preserve the kind of sense we already make of such 
actions. This is what it means for Scanlon to be “realistic” 
about reasons. But this identification of reason with the 
intentional on one hand, and with the idea of a full blown 
justification on the other also requires him to move back 
and forth between these two senses of “reason.” There is 
the “strong” sense (or use) of “reason” in which appeal to a 
reason defends the act against possible normative criticism, 
justifies it. This is a sense of “reason” that will, by 
definition, be true of some actions but not of others. On the 
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other hand there is a sense of “a reason” in which it is 
simply a feature of any full description of an action, so long 
as the act is minimally intentional—so long as it is, one 
might say, an act at all.  
 
At one point Scanlon writes: “like [Gibbard and Blackburn] 
I am claiming that normative judgments are about our 
reactions to the natural world rather than about that world 
itself (specifically, in my case, about the appropriateness of 
these reactions).” (52, italics his) And he is quite right to 
make the point this way—if we are talking about reasons in 
the “strong” sense. He can, and they cannot, speak about 
turning the wheel as the appropriate reaction, and when he 
uses the term, but not when they do, “appropriate” can 
really mean something, can really have truth conditions 
apart from the unconstrained intentions of the speaker. But 
the idea of an action expressing an “appropriate” reaction 
to the world becomes truly minimal, almost simply 
semantic, when the bit of the world in question, the thing to 
which my action is the “appropriate response” is said to be 
the fact that I enjoy doing this. Now, Scanlon’s view seems 
simply to give us the New Age platitude, “everything 
happens for a reason.” Of course, this is not quite the 
platitude we might, previously, have thought—it is quite 
different from saying, as the expressivists must say 
“everything happens (simply) as a result of a cause.” But 
appeal to “reason” now simply explains the act in so far as 
it is understood to be an intentional act. We have (rightly) 
left “justification” in any substantive sense behind.  
 
Although this difference between a strong and weak sense 
of “reason” is important, it is essentially ignored in Being 
Realistic About Reasons. And this is because of Scanlon’s 
view about justification. Scanlon thinks the justifications 
we offer for our reason stories can only be assessed in a 
case by case way; there are no good general principles of 
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reason assessment. Of course, sometimes the claim that 
someone has a reason to do x will be impossible to contest 
and other times it will be quite the opposite; Scanlon hardly 
denies that. But he thinks that there can be no general 
marker, no interesting antecedent way to pick out why 
justification stories divide in this way. We just have to 
“look and see,” as someone else might have put it. I will 
argue below this is not quite right, and that the degree to 
which the justification story relies on, or implicates, a 
desire based fact marks out a reason-story of an importantly 
distinct kind—a disturbingly distinct kind, one might say.  
 
However, as I said earlier, what is important about this 
book is as much the counter account Scanlon gives of 
matters related to being realistic about reasons. Let me 
briefly turn to two of these, the ontology of reasons and 
explaining how reasons can motivate. I will then return to 
Scanlon’s account of what a reason is in more detail, taking 
up Scanlon’s account of its distinctive relational structure. 
Armed with this relational structure, we can also at last 
make the right sort of sense of “supervenience.” I will 
return to the vexing issue of reason assessment there.  
 
ARE REASONS QUEER? 
 
Naturalism is the lingua franca of the current philosophical 
age, and no one wishes to be accused of failing to give this 
Goddess the respect she deserves. One might as well try to 
survive the epithet “You socialist!” in the Republican 
primaries. But what exactly is it to be a naturalist, or to take 
naturalism seriously when it comes to ontology? When 
Mackie says “there are no objective values,” it would seem 
the claim is based on the view that all of our ontological 
commitments must be understood as claims about what 
exists in the physical world of space and time. It is this 
sense of “universe” he has in mind when he says that 
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objective values would involve entities, qualities or 
relations “different from anything else in the universe.” 
(17) And this of course is the thought that lies behind the 
frequently made argument that if there were irreducible 
normative truths, such things would be “incompatible with 
a scientific view of the world.” Scanlon writes: “This idea, 
that our ontological commitments should be restricted to 
things in the physical world of particles and planets that is 
described by science may strike many as a sensible 
naturalism. But it is an idea we should not accept.” (17)  
 
It is not part of the scientific view that only the things we 
speak about when within that view can be countenanced. 
That is an extra bit of unjustified philosophy. Scanlon 
offers instead a domain-centered approach to ontology that 
runs as follows: 
 
The way of thinking about these matters that makes 
the most sense is a view that does not privilege 
science but takes as basic a range of domains, 
including mathematics, science, and moral and 
practical reasoning. It holds that statements within 
all of these domains are capable of truth and falsity, 
and that the truth values of one domain, insofar as 
they do not conflict with statements of some other 
domain, are properly settled by the standards of the 
domain that they are about. (19) 
 
Crucial here is the expression “insofar as they do not 
conflict.” It is one thing to make a claim that the scientific 
view disallows—say, that there are witches, and that they 
can, with spells, make people ill or cause cows to stop 
giving milk. That claim is inconsistent with the scientific 
world and is rightly set aside. But normative claims are 
simply different from scientific claims; they are not, simply 
for that reason, inconsistent with the scientific domain. It is 
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interesting that this point, to me undeniable, is never 
illustrated in the literature with respect to legal concepts, 
where the Mackie like argument would seem especially 
foolish. So, do we furrow our brows and wonder “if there 
was negligence, or legal guilt, such things would be of a 
different order than anything else in the universe”? Does 
anyone then propose an “error theory” of legal findings? 
No, the argument is absurd, a true waste of time. No one 
thinks that negligent talk is incompatible with scientific 
talk. It is simply a different domain, and within that domain 
we make no claims about the things that science takes up.   
 
Scanlon sees no need to defend a general idea of “exists” of 
which all domains would be instances. There might well be 
such a notion, (Scanlon is agnostic about that), but unless 
more is said, unless such a theory is before us, this 
“perfectly general idea of existence” seems empty, unlike 
what we can say when within a domain (“you do have a 
reason,” “that was lightening,” and so forth). (23) Nor does 
a “domain centered” view mean that first order domains are 
entirely autonomous. Even pure statements within a domain 
(pure mathematical statements, abstract moral principle 
statements, and so forth) might entail or presuppose 
statements in some other domain, and when that happens, 
they must be reconciled. (21) And finally, neither is it 
profitable to give some theory of what counts as 
“reconciliation,” or how best to achieve it. Once upon a 
time, philosophers worried about how physics could be 
reconciled with something called free will. Now, the worry 
is more helpfully framed in terms of whether mental 
explanations are autonomous or reducible to physical ones. 
In the opinion of this reader, Scanlon successfully defends 
his robust anti foundationalism. Normative talk is assessed 
by the methods and convictions suitable to normative talk; 
there are no metaphysical grounds, no good arguments, 
preventing us from taking talk about reasons seriously. One 
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day, I truly believe, we will not even need to have this 
argument rehearsed, this bogeyman of queerness exorcised.  
 
MOTIVATION ANYONE? 
  
Well, OK, no bad metaphysics is going to stop stand-alone 
talk about reasons and norms. But isn’t this realism about 
reasons necessarily incomplete? Suppose certain facts in 
certain circumstances are reasons, just as Scanlon says. 
How could the mere belief in such things explain action? 
Don’t we need to posit some further active element, such as 
the adoption of a plan, or endorsement of a norm, for action 
to follow?  
 
Well, we do need something further, obviously. 
Propositions themselves, whatever their content, cannot, of 
course, bring some act about. But what is needed is not 
what the expressivist would propose. The expressivist, 
remember, tries to capture what it is for some consideration 
to be a reason in an account of what it is for someone to 
treat some consideration as a reason. (57) When you think 
about it, it is almost obvious that this can never work. How 
can there be any possibility of explaining why some 
posture or other is justified if we say “being a reason” just 
is this (or any other) posture? Realism regarding reasons is 
the only way forward. And to the perennial question: but 
how can such reasons (“on their own” one might say) bring 
an action about?—the answer is, well, they don’t. We 
explain an agent’s action by reference to awareness of such 
a reason by drawing on the right idea of a rational agent. A 
rational agent  
 
…is, first, one that is capable of thinking about the 
reasons for certain actions or attitudes, and for 
reaching conclusions about which of these are good 
reasons. Second, a being is a rational agent only if 
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the judgments that it makes about reasons make a 
difference to the actions and attitudes that it 
proceeds to have. A perfectly rational agent would 
always have attitudes and perform the actions that 
are appropriate according to the judgments about 
reasons that he or she accepts… More exactly, if a 
rational agent believes that p is a conclusive reason 
to do a, she generally will do a, and do it for this 
reason…When a rational agent does something that 
he or she judges him or herself to have reason to do, 
this judgment makes sense of the action in 
normative terms and explains it, because the action 
is what one would expect of a rational agent who 
accepted that judgment. Presumably there is also a 
causal explanation to this connection, and of the 
more general uniformities that I have referred 
to…But this causal explanation is another story, for 
the neuroscientists to fill in. (54-55) 
 
I expect that some readers will find Scanlon too quick, or 
too cute; simply (it will be said) positing the kind of thing 
he needs and then defining it in such a way to make the 
account go through. But I am sympathetic. Scanlon here, on 
my view, simply generalizes from what we would say 
about particular people acting on particular reasons. 
Remember: “rational agent” here means something like 
“acts on the reasons one has.” It does not mean, as it means 
in economic texts or comic books, that remarkable figure 
who only has impeccable reasons to begin with. When 
Ronnie goes to the party because it is fact that he enjoys 
dancing, for Scanlon, this is just what rational agents do—
they act, when things don’t break down, on whatever 
reasons they have. If it is a fact that I am interested in 
Roman sculpture and I find out that there is an exhibit of 
Roman sculpture nearby, I will then conclude I have a 
reason to go; if I do go, I go for that reason. Scanlon’s 
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appeal to the idea of a “rational agent” is nothing more than 
a general way of putting this point. We are, in so far as we 
are rational, responsive to the reasons we have. Some 
reasons may be tied to our particular interests. Some may 
be tied to our circumstances. Some may be tied simply to 
being a person. But there is no mystery in explaining 
someone’s act by reference to a reason that they actually 
have. So why not speak of a rational agent as just what we 
are in so far as we do this, generally—note and typically act 
on the reasons we actually have?  
 
The idea of rational agent as Scanlon is employing it is I 
think actually fairly anodyne. After all, to have a nature, or 
a personality, is to have, in certain facts, reasons. (Because 
I am interested in Roman art, this fact, that it is here in this 
gallery, is a reason, for me.) To be a “rational agent” is just 
to add to that point the possibility of noting all the other 
reasons you have in virtue of just being a person say, or just 
being in these circumstances. It is not circular, or empty, or 
terribly far from ordinary agents and ordinary ability. And 
with this notion we can explain how we can be realists 
about reasons and make sense of action by those who 
believe they have such reasons.  
 
PURE NORMATIVES, MIXED NORMATIVES AND 
SUPERVENIENCE 
  
Even Plato believed in supervenience. Surely it is particular 
things in the everyday world that bear normative 
ascriptions. There are good people, just laws, selfish rulers, 
foolish acts. And, as many have also noticed, the normative 
attribution will hardly persist across changes in the non-
normative one (the phenomenon of “co-variance”). If you 
cease to cause your neighbor pain, perhaps your action is 
no longer morally objectionable either. If facts (at least 
some facts) about the act change, the moral assessment will 
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change too. How are we to understand these things, the 
supervenience of the normative upon the non-normative 
and the co-variance of the normative with the non-
normative? And if the world of non-normative facts cannot 
be said to “entail” or generate normative claims or reasons 
on their own (the famous gap between is and ought), how is 
it that we move so smoothly, so effortlessly, so frequently, 
from non-normative claims to normative ones all the time? 
Scanlon thinks he knows, and offers a genuinely original 
framework that explains it all for you.  
 
The right way into this problem is via the relational nature 
of a reason. When we speak of “a reason,” in everyday 
discourse, we are typically pointing to some consideration 
or other, some fact or other, actual or anticipated, that 
explains some act. (His reason for going into his father’s 
business is to make money next year. His reason for not 
going to the talk today is his dislike of the speaker.) But 
this use, perfectly legitimate to be sure, is but a part of the 
story. A reason is a reason for someone, who in turn is in 
particular set of circumstances. A full description requires 
we make clear the relational quality of reasons. Scanlon 
writes: 
 
Whether a certain fact is a reason, and what it is a 
reason for, depends on an agent’s circumstances. 
The fact that this piece of metal is sharp is a reason 
for me not to press my hand against it, but under 
different circumstances, it might be a reason to 
press my hand against it, and under still different 
circumstances, a reason to do something else, such 
as to put it into the picnic basket if I will later have 
reason to want to cut cheese. This suggests that “is a 
reason for” is a four-place relation, R(p, x, c, a), 
holding between a fact p, an agent x, a set of 
conditions c and an action or attitude a. This is the 
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relation that holds just in case p is a reason for a 
person x in situation c to do or hold a. (31)   
 
Several things must be added. First, these variables are 
often interrelated. The “circumstances” in which something 
is said to be a reason may involve reference to the agent, 
and it may be more or less easy to specify the agent apart 
from such reference. So, it may be that it is because I hold a 
certain institutional office that this fact is a reason for me to 
act a certain way (say, to vote against this proposal). (32) 
This is the easy case. More slippery is the reappearance of 
the earlier point but now in this framework: for example, if 
we were to say it is part of my present circumstances that I 
would enjoy smoking marijuana right now. In this second 
case, “the circumstances” and “the agent” are now hard to 
separate. This is not exactly, or not yet, a criticism; it is 
simply a feature of the relational framework before us. And 
finally, Scanlon is very anxious to draw our attention to the 
“factive character” of most statements about reasons. “P is 
not a reason for someone in c to do a unless p obtains, and 
the person in question is actually in circumstances c.” (32)  
 
An interesting puzzle arises from this last, at first, 
seemingly innocuous claim. If p does not obtain, then the 
normative claim about reason R, “R(p, x, c, a),” cannot 
obtain either. And does this not seem to generate a 
normative claim from a non-normative one after all, a value 
from a fact? (36) One could block this anomalous outcome 
by stipulating that perhaps only “positive” normative 
claims fail to follow from any non-normative ones, but 
Scanlon understandably feels this is beside the point. The 
deeper, more interesting truth about normativity lies just 
ahead. While p is not reason for anyone unless p is the case, 
obviously, there is an equally important counterpart point: 
we can spell out normative relations between certain facts 
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and certain reasons quite apart from whether the facts we 
refer to happen to be the case or not. Scanlon writes:  
 
This move [stipulating that “the absence of R” will 
not count as a counterexample to the “no value from 
the facts” thesis] might avoid the problem, but it 
also ignores an important point about the relation R, 
which is that the essentially normative content of a 
statement that R(p, x, c, a) is independent of 
whether p [actually] holds.  This normative content 
lies in the claim that, whether p obtains or not, 
should p hold, then it is a reason someone in c to do 
a. So I will take what I call a pure normative claim 
to be a claim that R(p, x, c, a) holds … understood 
in this way. (36-37) 
 
And thus an extremely fertile framework is born. “Many of 
the claims we commonly think of as normative are not pure 
normative claims, but mixed normative claims.” (37) A 
mixed normative claim “involves” a pure normative claim, 
but also makes, or presupposes, certain claims about how 
things just happen to be. When the two are combined, a 
claim about reasons will follow. Let us illustrate this with 
respect to what is sometimes called a “thick” ethical 
concept, say “cruel” (Scanlon’s example). To claim 
“Caligula was cruel” is to make a claim about what he saw 
as a reason (what he responded to and was indifferent to)—
this is presumably a fact about Caligula—and to make the 
normative claim that he should not been indifferent to these 
considerations. Typically, there are further (pure) 
normatives in the background as well: the claim that cruelty 
is something one has reason to avoid in oneself and 
condemn in others, that one has good reason to react 
differently to someone who is cruel than to someone who is 
not, to avoid their company, not to trust them in certain 
contexts, and so forth. The claim “Caligula is cruel” 
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conjoins a claim about what reasons people should and 
should not act on, with a factual claim about Caligula. Such 
“pure normative” claims about reasons give these thick 
ethical concepts their point, and will guide their empirical 
application. But the point holds even when we turn to very 
general normative notions, like “wrong” or “right.” To 
claim an action type is morally wrong is “to claim that it 
has [factual] properties that provide reasons to reject any 
principle that would permit it” (37). “Even the claim ‘she 
has good reason not to do it because it would hurt her 
sister’s feelings’ is a mixed claim, since it cannot be true 
unless the action in question would in fact hurt her sister’s 
feelings.” (38) 
 
And armed with this distinction between pure and mixed 
normative claims, we can now, perhaps for the first time, 
make sense of how we do in fact move from facts to values 
all the time. The standard approach to this problem is to 
start with some conception of “the facts” and then wonder 
“how in Heaven’s name could we get from this sort of stuff 
to any claims about what ought to be the case, or to what is 
“good”? (This is Hume; this is Ayer; this is Mackie’s 
“queerness” argument.) But this is very much the wrong 
way to conceive of the matter. Start with the normative 
claims, the pure normative claims, claims about what sorts 
of considerations, as a matter of kind, support the 
normative judgments we think right. While Scanlon himself 
thinks that in the end, normative claims are best thought of 
as claims about reasons, commitment to this thesis is not at 
all necessary for the point being made here. We could, if 
we like, think of “x is good” in a way that made no 
reference to “reasons” at all; the point still holds.  
 
If the relation, R, and other reason relations, are 
not the fundamental normative notions in this 
sense [are not the relation from which all others 
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can be derived - SR] then there can be pure 
normative claims of other kinds, which may or 
may not be analyzable in terms of reasons. For 
example, instead of focusing on the one place “x is 
good” and the corresponding one place property, 
consider the relation “having the property p 
contributes to a thing x’s being good” or “having 
property p contributes to a thing x’s being a good 
y.” Using these relations we can formulate pure 
normative claims about goodness, which like the 
pure normative claims I have been discussing that 
involve [reasons], are normatively necessary and 
have the function of assigning normative 
significance to non-normative properties…The 
important point is not about the fundamentality of 
reasons but about the central role of pure 
normative claims, whatever normative concepts 
they involve. (42)   
 
The point, and it is a very provocative one, is two-fold. 
First, “the normative” includes pure normative claims and 
mixed ones. The pure normatives are non-empirical 
relational claims from the start, specifying what facts, as 
types, generate what kinds of reasons for persons in which 
sorts of circumstances. “A man driving and could with a 
turn of the wheel avoid a pedestrian has a reason to turn the 
wheel”—that is a pure normative. Second, such claims then 
will “license inferences,” should they be conjoined with 
claims about what is the case, to claims about what one 
should do, or has a reason to do. That is how we move from 
facts to values or from facts to normative claims about what 
one should do. This framework also explains 
“supervenience”—I put the term in scare quotes now 
because we see, under this framework, that reasons, or 
normative claims, arise relationally, not “causally.” The 
“value” does not really “supervene on” “the fact.” The fact 
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is but one variable within a four part relational story, which 
in turn constitutes a claim about reasons.  
 
However, the reader may wonder just how much we 
achieve here, unless we can go on and say something about 
the degree to which we can think of these claims about 
reasons as objective. After all, one might say early 
expressivists like R.M. Hare could accommodate the 
skeletal form of this point—without the sophistication of 
Scanlon’s particular framework to be sure, but able to offer 
a parallel account of (so called) “supervenience” and the 
move from facts to reasons all the same. Consider: we 
affirm, on Hare’s view, some action guiding, fundamentally 
non-cognitive principle (we assume it passes the 
prescriptivity requirement). And in light of this principle, 
plus some rudimentary recognition skills, we can see what 
facts provide a reason for action. My principle, in Hare like 
form, is “all acts of giving money to the needy are good.” I 
look around and see that, oh, what do you know? Here, 
before me, is a case where someone is needy, and voila! I 
have a reason, and away I give. The world of value, or 
reasons, “supervenes on” the world of facts in pretty much 
the same way as it does in Scanlon’s account, and the move 
from facts in the world to reasons for action is explained in 
pretty much the same way too. What is the difference? 
 
The difference, of course, is that Scanlon thinks there really 
are reasons. Reasons are not some artifact of mere will, and 
an unconstrained will at that, as they are in Hare, ceasing to 
obtain as soon as our will might alter. For in that case, 
under that analysis, there are no reasons at all (it has been 
argued); certainly nothing of the kind that can do the sort of 
real justificatory work we think we are doing when we 
explain why, for example, we turned the wheel, damaging 
the fender, to avoid that cat. That is a pretty big difference, 
to be sure. But now we must probe a bit more into the 
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status of reasons in different sorts of cases, and the status of 
the various kinds of arguments that allegedly establish their 
existence.  
 
I will approach the point I want to make about arguments 
for reasons via some remarks by Scanlon I find peculiar, 
perhaps even suspicious. In the passage above, Scanlon 
says that the pure normative claims that license inferences 
are “normatively necessary.” Whatever might this mean? 
Scanlon says very little in elaboration, but earlier, he 
writes: 
 
The truth of pure normative claims, by contrast [by 
contrast with mixed normative claims, which are 
true, when they are, just in case certain non-
normative facts are also true] does not depend on, 
nor co-vary with, non-normative facts. Nor do pure 
normative facts vary ‘on their own’. Given that they 
do not, the mixed normative facts that depend on 
them supervene on non-normative facts. This again 
is a normative matter, a case of normative necessity. 
This seems evident from reflection on what pure 
normative truths are. But it does not seem to me, on 
reflection, to be something that we should find 
puzzling. Given that pure normative facts are not 
contingent in the most obvious way—that is 
dependent on contingent facts about the natural 
world—why should we expect them to be 
contingent in some further sense? (41)  
 
Pure normative facts, or claims, are “normatively 
necessary,” and “not contingent in the most obvious way.” 
Just how are we to understand this? It is a puzzling thing to 
say. On one hand, I think Scanlon is simply alerting us to a 
kind of contrast. If we say a reason arises because there is a 
normative connection between some fact type and some 
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person in some circumstances (all specified now in terms of 
type, so we preserve the “purity” of the normative), this 
cannot be understood as an empirical or causal claim. And 
this seems innocuous enough. But to call such claims 
“necessary,” or to call the relation between the various 
variables (understood as types) and a reason one of 
“necessity” is not only misleading, it is I think disallowed 
by Scanlon’s own commitment to domain independence. 
(Scanlon has more or less conceded this point to me in 
conversation.) When we have the sort of semantic relations 
we have in language, or the operational relations we have 
in logic, or the causal laws we have in the empirical world, 
we can make sense of how it is that certain claims, or 
things, are, and are not, “necessary.” But in the normative 
domain, there is no clear place for that sort of claim. The 
relation between a fact, a set of circumstances, a person and 
a reason is not like any of these—it is not semantic, logical, 
or casual (obviously). And so to call this relation 
“necessary” is to attempt to import a kind of solemnity or 
fixity that the domain cannot bear (and should not bear); it 
is to import the methods and concepts that are appropriate 
in other domains into a domain where they are not 
appropriate, where they cannot help but generate a kind of 
out of focus result. What is this relation between a fact, a 
person, a set of circumstances, and the reason that it 
generates? I cannot say. And I don’t think Scanlon can say 
either. It is not empirical or contingent; Scanlon certainly 
has that right. But we simply engage in mystification if we 
then call it “necessary.”  
 
Could normative claims be necessary, in another, more 
straightforward sense? Could the content of a normative 
claim be necessary in that we could not imagine the claim 
not holding? That is, could some normative claims be such 
that we could not imagine a possible world in which they 
would not hold, in which the asserted content would not be 
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true? Sure; some facts, persons and reasons are so tightly 
woven together, or woven together at a level of description 
so intimately tied to how we think of what it is to be a 
person, that it is hard to imagine a possible world in which 
it could be otherwise. Consider pain. There might be all 
sorts of facts about a person’s circumstances as a result of 
which he has reason to overlook that p is a source of pain, 
but that pain is a reason—this cannot be imagined 
otherwise, unless we imagine something very different 
from what a person is to begin with. Perhaps something 
similar can be said for the well-being of our children. It is 
hard to imagine, given what we know about how we have 
been shaped, creatures like ourselves that just did not care 
very much about their offspring. The point we get via 
modus tolens seems undeniable: if there were creatures that 
typically did not care about the well-being of their 
offspring, they would not be persons, not be like us at all. 
Here we can say (maybe): in no possible world at all like 
the one we know could things like this be otherwise for 
persons, could the content of the reason-claims that such 
facts supported not be true.   
 
But I do not think there are many cases like this. We can 
often, easily, imagine possible worlds very much like our 
own in which some pure normative, some true claim about 
some fact giving some person a reason, would have failed 
to arise. It is not as if Scanlon’s framework fails to account 
for this thought—the framework specifies “circumstances” 
and “facts” giving rise to reasons, and these things are 
usually pretty contingent; they will surely come and go 
with the arbitrariness of fortune. But something interesting 
follows from pressing this point, particularly in those 
cases—here it is again, of course—where “the fact” that 
occupies the p position in R(p, x, c, a) is just the fact that 
the agent would enjoy doing a. Or the fact is the fact that 
the agent thinks of the act as a V-type act, where V names 
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some idiosyncratic value the agent happens to hold dear. 
Sometimes these desires or claims about worth disappear, 
or arise, because of the contingencies of psychology. 
Sometimes they disappear, or arise, because of the 
contingencies of history. I will say more about each of 
these below. But the result is, in either case is, they are not 
“necessary” normative claims in any substantive sense. 
And this turns out to be very important for how we 
understand their justificatory power. Let us leave this 
endlessly enchanting world of subscripts and variables and 
take up an actual case or two.  
 
So consider our good friend Gaugin, once a rather 
frequent visitor to philosophy journals discussing reasons 
and their objectivity. Gaugin has a reason to leave his 
family and go to the South Seas, pursuing artistic 
development and sexual satisfaction because…well, I 
guess because he is constituted in such a way as to want 
these things, and to want them more than staying in 
France and painting there. The fact in the R(p, x, c, a) 
relation claim, the fact that is “subjunctivized away” 
(Scanlon’s expression) and represented simply as a 
possible fact (or fact type) when we turn to the pure 
normative is just the fact that a person like this happens to 
want these sorts of things. If you like, you can add “very 
much.” OK, fine. But in our enlightened world, we don’t 
treat these facts as so immovable. Contingent they are 
indeed, and should Gaugin take a Zoloft or two, 
something all his friends are urging, he soon comes to 
treat these desires as a bit silly, perhaps appropriate for a 
teenager on Facebook, hardly so consuming after all. Now 
of course, if by “Gaugin” we mean “Gaugin exactly as he 
is right now,” with his brain just like this, and without any 
Zoloft coming into the mix, then of course, our initial pure 
normative not only “remains,” it remains “necessary”—
for this version of “Gaugin” one might say—and all has 
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been saved. Of course, we now have a sense of 
“necessary” which will be equally applicable before the 
empirical world, but never mind. More embarrassing is 
the status of this other creature, Gaugin(2), the imagined 
future self who does take the Zoloft. He of course would 
have other pure normatives “necessarily” true of him 
(since his desires, and so the facts, and his circumstances, 
differ); what do we say about that? I will leave the 
difficulties of multiplying pure normatives for every 
alteration in a person’s brain chemistry and desires, and so 
the difficulty of adjudicating between such normatives, for 
the person who might, or could, be either, for another day. 
I take it no one really wants to go down that road. And 
needless to say, such talk would be an embarrassment for 
Scanlon, who rightly prides himself on being more 
faithful to everyday talk than philosophers usually are. We 
don’t in fact employ a conception of personal identity that 
swerves with every change in one’s present desires. In our 
everyday discourse we usually assume we have “the same 
person” through a few drinks, a mad crush on the 
bartender or waitress, or a mild course of anxiety reducing 
drugs. And so: how can whatever “pure normatives” that 
are merely true of some particular, ephemeral time slice of 
some self, be termed “necessary”? More to the real point 
at hand: what sort of authority can a normative claim that 
is contingent in this way actually have?  
 
This point can be made historically too. I take it as 
uncontentious that certain ideas, or conceptions, of self-
expression, arise at certain points of history. It is very hard 
to imagine the Gaugin story in the late Middle Ages, say. 
Of course, there were very ambitious and vain people then 
to be sure; Shakespeare’s plays abound with them. But the 
particular idea of leading a self-expressive life that is 
featured in the Gaugin story, where that means, not 
exacting revenge on your half-brother for stealing your 
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kingdom, but just painting somewhere else and getting the 
chance to chase a certain kind of girl—no, this is not 
around from the beginning of time. Such facts are not 
“reasons” until a certain point in the history of culture. The 
pure normative that would pick out such facts as reasons 
could not even be imagined prior to a certain point in 
history. But to be fair to Scanlon, all this might mean is that 
the pure normative in question here would have to be 
appropriately historically subscripted—for someone at this 
time, at this point in Western history, with these desires, 
this self-conception, and these interests, so and so would be 
a reason. And sure, we can say that. Appropriately qualified 
and subscripted, I suppose it remains a “pure” normative. 
(And every madcap contingent accident can be expressed 
as flowing from a tense-less causal law—if we have the 
right contingent subscripts in the law’s specification too). 
But what do we gain by this glamorizing terminology? To 
repeat the earlier point, how much justificatory work can a 
pure normative like this ever do?  
 
More needs to be said about the desire, or about the nature 
of the desire, that does so much work in these cases. 
Sometimes the desire that underwrites the fact someone 
would enjoy doing a (and so makes it the case that the 
person has a reason to do a) might be fairly brute, perhaps, 
even if you like, non-cognitive. Perhaps that is how it is 
how in the Gaugin story. He just wants this, period, in the 
sort of way Hume would recognize and applaud. But 
sometimes the desire comes wrapped up the clothing of 
additional endorsement. The (in my view, exceptionally 
talented) writer William Vollmann regularly patronizes 
prostitutes and takes drugs. He does this because he enjoys 
it, sure, but he also makes clear in his writings that he 
believes that such activity commendably expresses the 
values of freedom and skepticism towards bourgeois pieties 
that he thinks right. He would continue, he thinks, to have a 
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reason to do these things even should he begin to enjoy 
them less. Looking at Vollmann, Scanlon (and others) 
might feel his valorization of these activities, characterizing 
them under this description, is silly, teenage like, 
something appropriate for a posting on Facebook…sure. 
But does Vollmann have a reason because these activities 
bear these properties for him—or not? Is there a pure 
normative that is true simply because Vollmann happens to 
think and feel this way about these things? If we say “yes” 
(and it is fine with me if we do) then what have we gained, 
what has actually changed under this framework from what 
we would have had under easy going non-cognitivism 
about the normative? What is achieved, really, in 
characterizing this desire as supporting a particular kind of 
“fact,” “the fact of enjoyment,” when the nature of the 
enjoyment, the possibility of enjoyment, is predicated on 
the act bearing a description that it bears only because the 
agent says so, or feels a certain way?  
 
For me, what these examples, and the difficulties they raise, 
show, is not that objectivity is impossible here, but rather 
that it is very hard to say very much that is helpful about 
“the normative” overall. Scanlon wants to give an account 
of reasons, as such, everywhere and anywhere that they 
might arise. He probably has about as much that is 
impressive to say about such matters as there is to be said. 
But when we turn to the objectivity of reasons, I think there 
is a deep schism in the subject that is best faced, not blurred 
over. Now of course, the term “objectivity” here is has 
several senses. In one sense, reasons are “objective” simply 
in being ineliminable and non-reducible, in the “autonomy” 
of reason-type explanations before intentional action. But 
there is another sense of objectivity, or worry about 
objectivity with respect to reasons, when we wonder about 
their authority, and it is in this sense that there is, I think, a 
division that is best acknowledged. When we talk about 
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reasons that are rooted in certain considerations made 
familiar from moral life, such reasons have authority for 
anyone. Anyone, regardless of what they happen to want, 
has a reason to turn that wheel or wade into that shallow 
pond. But only Gaugin has this reason, only Bill Vollmann 
has that one. And appeals to these reasons, in these cases, 
are of very uncertain justificatory authority for others. The 
framework of justification is the same across the turning of 
the wheel case and Vollmann’s use of drugs and prostitutes. 
It is the same R(p, x, c, a). And it is a genuine philosophical 
accomplishment to put this framework forward, for 
whatever we think of the claim being made by its use in a 
particular case, it presents the relation between the 
normative and the non-normative in the most helpful light I 
know. But I think justification cannot approach the 
solipsistic either and still be a justification in any but the 
thinnest sense. Now in fact, in the Vollmann and Gaugin 
cases, the content appealed to is not, in the end, that hard to 
understand with a little sympathy; it is not, after all, wholly 
idiosyncratic. But we can move by degrees to cases where 
the content would be truly hard to understand, by anyone; 
where what it is that one enjoys is truly idiosyncratic, or 
what it is that one claims bears a certain normative property 
is truly foolish.  
 
I think we must acknowledge that, when our reasons are 
rooted in facts about others and their welfare, our reasons 
have a certain depth of justificatory authority. When they 
mirror desires, (when the fact that occupies the p place in 
R(p, x, c, a) is the fact of personal enjoyment, or the fact 
that such acts bear a certain description for the agent), the 
transpersonal justificatory authority may approach zero. Of 
course, it is not only reasons rooted in the welfare of others 
that can aspire to this sort of authority. As Thomas Nagel 
argued forty-five years ago, if my near future self will soon 
be at the South Pole, my reason to buy a good parka now 
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has about as much transpersonal justificatory authority as 
one could wish. What is crucial in these cases is this: here, 
and in the case of avoiding the hapless pedestrian, the facts 
that give rise to reasons can be easily made sense of apart 
from the contingencies of one’s present whims or desires. 
Or, perhaps what is the very same point, we can make 
sense of “the agent’s circumstances” without talking very 
much about what little desires happen to be floating around 
at that moment in that agent’s head. But in the other cases, 
the relevant “circumstances,” and so the reasons, may just 
be such contingent present desires or whims (tricked out a 
bit differently to be sure, such as “the fact that” certain 
things would be enjoyed, or “the fact that” certain actions 
are endorsed by the agent under a certain description). And 
then I think the pure normative that expresses this claim, 
the R(p, x, c, a) we can generate in this case, may have no 
authority at all. “Justification” in this sort of case has 
become essentially identical to mere “explanation,” (“this is 
how I feel,” “this is what I want”), and so cannot be 
“necessary” in any substantive sense either.  
 
Sometimes a reason’s authority is deeply bound up with 
indifference to desires. This point goes back to Kant, who 
makes it powerfully. I don’t care what you want, what your 
hypothetical imperative is, we can imagine Kant saying, 
you ought not to make a false promise for personal gain 
(for example). The reason (for Kant, this can only be a 
moral reason) has “desire-indifferent” authority. By 
contrast, sometimes all that a reason is, and its whole 
justificatory authority, just is being a desire, or, if we are to 
use the alternative language provided by Scanlon’s 
framework, the contingent fact of contingent enjoyment. 
This point goes back to Hume of course, and to Mill, who 
relies on it heavily, and credibly, in his political theory. 
Scanlon seeks an analysis of “the normative” or, of 
“reason,” that abstracts away from this difference. And so 
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for Scanlon, there is no difference in kind in the 
justification stories we tell about reasons, no interesting 
division in the genus worth pursuing. There are of course 
differences in justification, some are stronger or weaker 
than others, but this is merely a difference in how good we 
happen to find particular justifications in particular cases—
much as it would be in art criticism. Some critical 
assessments are very well founded, others much less so. 
One would not think there was any difference in art types 
that supported such a fact. But I think this holistic view of 
reasons, or of “the normative,” is a mistake, and it limits 
the reach of Scanlon’s argument. If we try to say something 
about reasons everywhere, it turns out that we must say a 
bit less. And I think the differences between Scanlon and 
the expressivist essentially disappear when we turn to those 
reasons whose justification stories must point, essentially, 
to “the fact that” the agent enjoys the act, or pursues it 
under a deeply personal description. Of course, the 
expressivist has the wrong ontology of reasons from the 
start as it were, and so he can never make sense of 
justification, not really—and not anywhere. Scanlon can, 
but sometimes there is no justification really to be had, 
something the expressivist is closer to from the start.  
 
That said, Scanlon has offered a very fertile account what 
a reason is, when “reason” is understood in this most 
general, overarching way. And he has also given us a first 
class counter argument to that of the expressivist at every 
turn. If any reader of this review happens to have even the 
slightest interest in the nature of justification, or simply 
has the brute desire to find out more about this subject, 
then, it really is fact that such a reader has a very good 
reason to read this book.  
 
 
 
